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Many empirical studies in the area of foreign direct investment (FDI) exclusively focus on
flows between industrialized countries. This article makes a contribution to the still relatively
sparse literature on FDI in emerging markets by estimating determinants of German FDI
flows to Latin America and Asia during the past decade. Using data contained in a newly
available Bundesbank microdatabase, an FDI flow variable, constructed from year-to-year
differences in FDI stocks adjusted for certain otherwise distorting factors, is empirically tested
with respect to several exogenous variables previously found to be significant in the literature.
These include so-called non-traditional factors such as country risk and agglomeration effects
which are widely regarded as influential for FDI in emerging market economies. This study
therefore focuses on estimating the effects of various risk measures and finds that country
risk, and partially political risk, is indeed detrimental to investments of German enterprises.
Moreover, German FDI in Latin America are found to have been market-seeking while those
in emerging Asia tended to exploit low factor costs. Methodically, this paper uses the SUR
estimation technique which allows for the contemporaneous correlation of disturbances as
well as first-order autocorrelation of the time series disturbances and cross-sectional
heteroskedasticity. In arriving at a parsimonious regression for each region, an Extreme
Bounds Analysis (Leamer, 1983 & 1985) is performed to select individual variables robust to
the inclusion of other explanatory variables. Making empirical use of German firm-level data,
additional estimations are performed for direct investment of the manufacturing sector and
three of its sub-sectors. Regarding the latter, the hypothesis that capital-intensive industries
react particularly strongly to the changes in the regulatory environment of the host country is
confirmed by the data.
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JEL Classification: F21, C33Zusammenfassung
Viele empirische Studien im Bereich der ausländischen Direktinvestitionen (“foreign direct
investment” – “FDI”) beziehen sich ausschließlich auf Investitionsströme zwischen
Industrieländern. Dieses Arbeitspapier trägt zu der noch vergleichsweise spärlichen Literatur
zu Direktinvestitionen in Schwellenländern bei. Es schätzt die Determinanten deutscher FDI-
Ströme in ausgewählten „Emerging Markets“ während der letzten Dekade. Mit Hilfe von
Daten, die in einer seit kurzem verfügbaren Mikrodatenbank der Bundesbank enthalten sind,
wird eine Stromgröße, die sich aus den Bestandsveränderungen der Direktinvestitions-
bestände errechnet und die um verzerrende Einflüsse bereinigt wird, empirisch hinsichtlich
verschiedener exogener, in der Literatur als signifikant befundener Variablen überprüft. Diese
schließen sogenannte nicht-traditionelle Faktoren wie Länderrisiko und Agglomerations-
effekte ein, die allgemein als einflussreich für Direktinvestitionen in Schwellenländern
erachtet werden. Die vorliegende Studie konzentriert sich demnach auf die Schätzung der
Bedeutung verschiedener Risikomaße und findet, dass das Länderrisiko und teilweise auch
das politische Risiko den Investitionen deutscher Unternehmen abträglich sind. Außerdem
wird gezeigt, dass deutsche Direktinvestitionen in Lateinamerika eher markterschließend
waren, während jene in den Schwellenländern Asiens stärker die Nutzung niedriger
Faktorkosten zum Ziel hatten. Methodisch wird die SUR Schätzmethode angewandt, die eine
Berücksichtigung gruppenweiser Korrelation der Störgrößen, eines autoregressiven Prozesses
erster Ordnung und Heteroskedastizität ermöglicht. Um ein sparsames Modell schätzen zu
können, wird eine „Extreme Bounds“-Analyse nach Leamer (1983 & 1985) durchgeführt, welche
die Auswahl von solchen Variablen bezweckt, deren Einfluss gegen die Einbeziehung anderer
exogener Variablen robust ist. Zudem werden Einzeldaten deutscher Firmen genutzt, um
weitere Schätzungen der Direktinvestitionen des Verarbeitenden Gewerbes und dreier
Untersektoren durchzuführen. Bezüglich Letzterer kann die Hypothese, dass kapitalintensive
Sektoren besonders stark auf Änderungen im regulatorischen Umfeld der Empfängerländer
reagieren, mit Hilfe der Daten bestätigt werden.Table of Contents
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Determinants of German Foreign Direct Investment in
Latin American and Asian Emerging Markets in the 1990s
1. Introduction
With hindsight, the 1990s were the decade of initial emerging market exuberance and
subsequent disillusionment. Foreign direct investment flows to prospering regions such as
Latin America and, most prominently, Asia grew by leaps and bounds – from about the mid-
1980s to the second half of the 1990s average annual worldwide FDI flows to developing
countries increased eightfold
1 – nourishing hopes for sustainable growth by transforming the
host countries’ infrastructure and enhancing their ability to withstand global economic
downturns. As a matter of fact, German FDI stocks (at book values) in the six largest Latin
American economies more than doubled between end-1989 and end-1997, while those of
German subsidiaries in the eight largest markets in Asia almost quadrupled during that period.
However, when the Asian crisis broke out, the long-held belief of these fast-growing
economies’ invulnerability was shattered, and it became apparent that warning signs such as
real overvaluation of the currency, high short-term foreign indebtedness of the country as a
whole or of individual sectors, as well as the absence of long-overdue structural reforms may
not have been heeded by a majority of foreign enterprises.
The question then is: were those “red flags” in the sense of worsening country and/or political
risk assessments – representing a subjective probability of certain adverse outcomes
2 –
perceived by international investors? This study aims at identifying the determinants of
German FDI in the emerging economies of Latin America and Asia throughout the past
decade, and, in particular, those relating to “governance” aspects, measured by indices of
country or political risk. Governance issues have consistently been, and still remain a major
challenge for emerging market economies. Despite having undertaken substantial stabilization
or liberalization efforts
3 and pursuing appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, many of these
countries are suffering from a wide range of political and regulatory deficiencies which need
to be tackled to appease investors. At first glance, emerging economies feature proper
investment regimes when in fact obscure licensing procedures and discretionary
administrative regulations characterize the true nature of the country’s investment policy.
                                                          
1 See Nunnenkamp (2001b), p. 4, who presents UNCTAD data.
2 Definition by Lehmann (1999), p. 22.
3 Lora (2001) provides cross-country evidence on the extent of trade, tax, labor and financial market reforms as
well as privatization in Latin America (see section 2.2.2).- 2 -
Even willing governments are thus often unable to convey credible signals to foreign
investors.
4
Most empirical research using German FDI data
5 has been undertaken with respect to
industrialized economies. Only a few studies are devoted exclusively to the investment
behavior of German enterprises in developing countries or emerging markets. Hubert and
Pain (1999) find in regressions restricted to non-EU countries, i.e. essentially developing
countries, that only stocks of research & development, unit labor costs in Germany relative to
the host country and real exchange rate volatility turn out to be significant with the expected
signs.
Similarly, only some German FDI studies employ political risk variables. Agarwal et al.
(1991), in a very comprehensive study of the traditional and risk-related determinants of
German investment abroad, generally find no deterring effect of political risk (composite risk
and, separately, strikes and lockouts) on FDI flows to developing countries in the 1980s.
Moore (1993) identifies an index of labor unrest in the 17 OECD countries examined.
Surprisingly, the number of days lost in strikes is mildly significant and positively correlated
with FDI flows. Jost and Nunnenkamp (2002) run cross-section and pooled regressions for
German FDI in more than 60 developing countries between 1989 and 2000. Apart from the
usual results for host country per-capita GDP and population, they find good scores for
country risk as measured by the Euromoney index and an openness measure (adjusted for
country size) as well as, in separate regressions, low political risk and a skill variable (rate of
secondary schooling) to exert a strong positive influence on FDI stocks.
6 Interestingly, the
importance of country risk and a skill variable is shown to rise over the course of the last
decade.
The paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section first explains how the FDI flow
variable used in this study is derived. It then gives an overview of the literature on
determinants of FDI in emerging markets, and, particularly, those factors relating to risk
aspects. Section three provides details on the econometric approach and the selection process
used for identifying robust variables among a pool of exogenous variables. The regression
results are presented in section four, with a distinction being made between the country, sector
and sub-sector level. Section five has the concluding remarks.
                                                          
4 See Lehmann (1999), p. 21.
5 For a good overview of German studies on FDI, see Fischer (2000).
6 It is quite likely, however, that most of the series containing the FDI stocks are non-stationary – a
phenomenon that is not appropriately accounted for in the purely static estimation. The authors additionally
examine flow data from the German balance of payments (note that the openness measure turns insignificant, p.
63) which is doubtful considering the conceptual shortcomings (see section 2.1.1 of this paper, second
indentation mark).- 3 -
2. Data
2.1 Endogenous variable
There is no unanimously agreed method of measuring FDI. Different studies proceed in
different ways. It, therefore, seems important to make as clear as possible how FDI has been
defined here and why this particular definition has been chosen. In this study, the endogenous
variable is the net inflow or outflow of direct investment capital of German investors into
emerging market economies during a given calendar year. Depending on how one looks at it,
foreign direct investment may be understood purely as a flow variable or as a stock variable.
The IMF Balance of Payments Manual does not exclusively recur to the cumulative stock of
FDI capital but defines direct investment as comprising “not only the initial transaction
establishing the relationship between the investor and the enterprise but also all subsequent
transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and
unincorporated”.
7
The direct investment capital flows used in the estimations are derived from the direct
investment stock statistics compiled by the Deutsche Bundesbank since 1976 as an annual
complete survey and published on a partly aggregated basis in Special Statistical Publication
No. 10 (“Kapitalverflechtung mit dem Ausland” – “International capital links”). These data
are now also available in the form of a computer-aided microdatabase for the years 1989 to
2000.
8 During the sample period, German enterprises reported minority interests (of at least
10% but less than 50%) in foreign enterprises if the balance-sheet total of the investment
target exceeded DM 10 million (in 1999: €5 million). Controlling interests (50% or more) had
to be reported if the investment target’s balance-sheet total exceeded DM 1 million (in 1999:
€0.5 million). In 2002 the threshold for both categories became €3 million. Indirect participating
interests likewise must be reported if a “dependent” (i.e. majority-owned) enterprise itself
holds a stake of at least 10% in another enterprise. It should be stressed, therefore, that foreign
direct investment merely represents the provision of financial capital – in this case by German
enterprises to their foreign subsidiaries.
9
The direct investment stocks included in the database are book values and are calculated as
the sum total of the investor’s share in the nominal capital of the investment target, the capital
                                                          
7 IMF (1997), p. 86. “Direct investment capital transactions include those that create or dissolve investments as
well as those that serve to maintain, expand, or reduce investments”; ibid., p. 88.
8 In the 1989 reporting year methodological changes were made which eliminated the comparability of the
stocks with those in the years 1976 to 1988.
9 Thus, the term “direct investment” has to be clearly distinguished from the neo-classical concept of
investment which is based on the change in value of capital goods (i.e. property, plant & equipment) on the
assets side of the balance sheet; see also Lehmann (1999), p. 10, Jost (1999), p. 141, Hausmann and Fernández-
Arias (2001), p. 33, or Razin (2002), p. 2.- 4 -
reserves, and the retained profits/profits brought forward (cumulative reinvested earnings).
Loans granted by the capital owners or affiliated enterprises are added to this equity capital.
To finally obtain the direct investment stock pursuant to the IMF’s “directional principle”, the
subsidiary’s lending to or claims on the parent company must be subtracted.
10 It should be
noted that the stock data quoted in foreign currency by the enterprise subject to reporting
requirements have to be converted into German currency at the current exchange rate on the
individual balance-sheet date (as mandated by the OECD Benchmark Definition).
11
2.1.1 Stocks Versus Flows
The use of stock data for estimating a flow variable is an imperfect approach due to several
distorting factors. Here is why this is and how the distortions are minimized:
-  In the Bundesbank’s stocks statistics the acquisition of assets is recorded in the form of
balance-sheet book values. However, in the case of takeovers, an additional amount
(goodwill) is frequently paid on top of the pure book value of the assets. These additional
sums were particularly significant in recent years in cases of technology company
takeovers. Therefore, evaluating the transaction data, which are recorded at market values
in the balance of payments, would be preferable  –  yet this raises other problems (see
below). However, as advanced developing countries rather than industrialized countries are
at the heart of this study, it may be assumed that, owing to the relatively uncertain profit
expectations and a political environment which is often difficult to gauge, the difference
between market and book values may not be substantial. In the case of newly established
subsidiaries (i.e. greenfield investment) these problems do not arise to begin with.
-  While transaction-based balance of payments data in this respect seem superior for
studying FDI flows, they have other serious shortcomings. For one thing, the FDI flows in
the German balance of payments statistics do not list the individual recipient abroad which
is a precondition for the sectoral analysis in (see section 4.2). What is more, only
                                                          
10 See Lipponer (2003), p. 219. The “directional principle” requires the direct investments to be separated
according to the direction of the capital flow. Loans from subsidiaries to the investor therefore have to be
deducted from the direct investment capital; see IMF (1997), p. 81. This practice contrasts with the asset liability
principle, which presents such assets as autonomous – counterbalancing – direct investments.
11 There is also the question of whether or not the stock data and thus also the FDI stock differences (which, after
suitable correction, are interpreted as flow data), should be adjusted for inflation in the host country – as is done
by Moore (1993), who deflates the stock differences using foreign price indexes for capital goods – or for
exchange rate effects as recommended by Wagner (1991), who eschews Bundesbank stock data for these
implicit effects. Accordingly, previous-year FDI stocks or, more correctly, the stocks of fixed assets and other
long-term assets, would have to be adjusted for both inflation and the change in the bilateral exchange rate in the
reporting year. Alternatively, one might rightfully assume that relative purchasing power parity holds and the
inflation differential between Germany and the host country in question is absorbed by the exchange rate, having
both distorting factors cancel each other out. To be sure, most empirical studies do not test nominal values but
either deflate the FDI variable or relate it either to GDP or some other scaling factor (see section 2.1.3).- 5 -
immediate direct investment relationships (as to equity capital) are recorded under
participating interests in the German balance of payments statistics, but not indirect ones,
i.e. those held via a holding company, which likewise compulsorily fall under the FDI
definition. Reinvested earnings stemming from indirect capital links are not included,
either. On balance, and leaving accounting issues aside, merely considering balance of
payments data means failing to use a fully consolidated system encompassing indirect
ownership and, therefore, in all likelihood greatly understating actual FDI capital.
12
Therefore, in measuring the investment activity of German multinationals, the only
“relevant” flow variable – if there is one to be had – should be derived from (adequately
modified) differences in stocks and not by using flows recorded in the balance of
payments. Accordingly, this study uses a modified FDI “flow” variable, i.e. the difference
in FDI stock from one year to another, adjusted for actual participation rates, deviating
reporting years, balance-sheet depreciation and repatriated profits.
13 This variable
nevertheless corresponds – apart from the distortions mentioned above –  to the basic
definition of direct investment capital transactions contained in the IMF’s Balance of
Payments Manual.
14
-  The balance-sheet values are shown in the stock statistics at the respective reporting date of
the direct investment enterprise concerned, which sometimes differs from the end of the
calendar year. For practical reasons the unadjusted figures are not divided between the two
calendar years included in the reporting year of such enterprises.
15 Instead, all balance-
sheet values of enterprises whose reporting date falls before June 30 – i.e. whose reporting
year therefore mostly does not coincide with the current reporting year of the stock
statistics – are included in the preceding calendar year.
2.1.2 Adjustment for Participation Rates, Balance-Sheet Depreciation, Repatriated Profits
-  The FDI microdatabase contains participation rates for indirectly owned interests (usually
held via a holding company) which need to be adjusted for the share of FDI capital that
                                                          
12 See OECD (1996), p. 11.
13 For a good methodological overview see Bellak (1999), p. 120-122.
14 “The components of direct investment capital transactions ... are equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other
capital associated with various intercompany debt transactions”; IMF (1997), p. 87. Hausmann and Fernández-
Arias (2001) explicitly adhere to the flow concept: “FDI is defined as the increase in the equity position of a
non-resident owner...” (p. 33).
15 This applies to 2,923 of 32,240 reports (9.1%) for the 14 emerging markets considered here. Theoretically, it
would be possible in these cases to include the balance-sheet values in the previous year linearly with the period
not coinciding with the year under review (for example, if May 31, 1999, were the reporting date, seven-twelfths
of the balance-sheet values originally included in 1999 would be assigned to the 1998 reporting/calendar year,
with the value for 1999 being adjusted accordingly). For technical reasons – this breakdown would require a
“matching” of the reporting numbers of the investor and the investment target over all of the sample years at the
microdata level, which is not feasible – this is not an option.- 6 -
German investors effectively hold. That is, the “real” participation rate is calculated as the
product of the vertical ownership shares. Doing so is necessary to account for multiple
ownership in holding companies. For example, if a holding company has a 50% stake in a
direct investment company and is itself equally owned by two German investors, the
adjusted participation will be 25% for each parent.
-  As the assets are recorded as book values and are depreciated by a certain rate mandated by
foreign tax regulations, the left-hand side of the balance sheet does not correspond to the
actually existing (historical) capital stock. This pure taxation effect needs to be removed.
Accordingly, by using a perpetual inventory model,
16 FDI stocks are adjusted for the
original tax depreciation undertaken when calculating the profit of the subsidiary; the aim
of this adjustment is to determine which fixed assets are available for production each year.
To this end, the net capital stock (fixed assets) of the investment target is marked up for
each year using a notional depreciation rate of 8%,
17 which is multiplied by the share of
FDI capital in total assets. The resulting gross capital stock of the following period is
adjusted for increases or decreases in productive capital. By contrast, write-downs of
financial assets, especially those of service providers, are not adjusted because the
depreciation rate is uncertain. The inflow of direct investment capital in a given period
therefore is the difference of the stocks
18 between the current year’s stocks and preceding
years’ stocks plus the imputed depreciation of the adjusted capital stock.
19
-  The resulting flow variable still includes the total annual surplus rather than merely the
profits remaining in the investment target after transferring the parent company's share of
the profit – i.e. reinvested profits. Accordingly, the profits of the previous year repatriated
in the current year would need to be deducted from this flow variable.
20 As this
information cannot be extracted directly from the FDI stock statistics, a suitable
approximation is called for: in the case of direct participating interests, the item “income
                                                          
16 This adjustment is recommended by Bellak (1999), p. 125.
17 The rate of 8% used here is calculated as the average of economic depreciation rates for  "industrial buildings" (3.6 %)
and for “industrial plant and machinery” (12.3%). These rates were suggested by Chennels and Griffith (1997), p. 92. 
18 In this connection it should be noted that, in the case of direct participating interests, those in dependent
holding companies which themselves hold at least a 10% stake in another company have to be excluded from the
stock of direct investment capital in order to avoid double counting – these own participating interests are
recorded separately as indirect FDI. This approach is not applied to dependent holdings without participating
interests required to be reported or to minority-owned holdings with their own participating interests; see
Lipponer (2003), p. 218, and Jost (1999), p. 144.
19 To give an example, the inflow (exclusive of repatriated profits) for the year 1991 is calculated as follows:
FDI Flow1991 = ∆ FDI1991 + (∆ FA1991 + (∆ FA1990 + FA1989 * (1+δ )) * (1+δ )) * δ ,
where
∆ FDI = difference between the “original” direct investment stocks in the reporting year and the previous year
FA = fixed assets * percentage share of assets (i.e. investor's share of capital)
δ = notional depreciation rate (8%)
20 As was done, for instance, by Singh and Jun (1995), p. 11.- 7 -
from dividends and other profits” relating to German outward FDI (as recorded in the
German balance of payments statistics
21) is used. For indirect participating interests,
unfortunately, no such information is available.
22 For simplicity, a full profit transfer from
the investment target to the holding company (by virtue of a corresponding agreement) is
assumed.
23 Accordingly, total profits are subtracted from the indirect FDI capital in each
year, yielding reinvested earnings as the difference between the following year’s retained
profits/profits brought forward and those of the current year. This difference is already
reflected in the variation of FDI stocks across years.
24 A comparison of the flows derived
from “raw” and adjusted differences in FDI stocks illustrates that while these deviations
may not dramatically alter the econometric outcome, they can cause individual variables to
gain or lose significance.
25
2.1.3 Absolute and Normalized FDI Flows
The study uses a principal endogenous variable, FDIGDP, defined as outflows of German
foreign direct investment to a given host country as a percentage of its GDP (both in nominal
values (D-Marks)). The countries comprise the largest emerging market economies
26 in Latin
America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela) as well as South and
Southeast Asia (People’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). Given that larger economies have consistently been
shown to receive larger FDI inflows (see section 2.2.1, market size), the above normalization
is performed to eliminate size effects and thus to determine the linkage between FDI flows
and the variations in external factors over and above absolute market size as implied by GDP.
Correspondingly, estimations are centered on deviations from an implied average value of
FDI flows and size of host countries. In addition, a related variable, FDIFLOW, is defined in
absolute values, adjusted for inflation differentials and nominal exchange rate changes, i.e. the
                                                          
21 Deutsche Bundesbank, Statistical Supplement No. 3, Table 5b "Factor income – income from direct
investment“, column 2.
22 See Jost (1999), p. 133.
23 This adjustment was carried out for 993 out of 2941 positions (or 33.7%) at the sector-aggregated level.
24 In principle, retained profits/profits brought forward would have to be subtracted in the case of newly acquired
direct investment companies. However, it is only for 1997-1999 that such positions can be identified in the
microdata by checking whether an investment target surfaces in the database the following year. This is no
longer possible for the years 1989-1996 as data prior to 1996 have already been rendered anonymous. Therefore,
in order to avoid additional bias due to incomplete adjustments, these equity positions are left unchanged.
25 Referring to regressions in section 4, at the country level (Latin American sub-sample) the trade taxation
variable drops from a 1% level of significance (unadjusted flows) to the 5% level (adjusted flows) while the
reverse is true for the agglomeration variable. Similarly, at the sector level (Asian sub-sample), country risk and
exchange rate volatility now lose their respective weak significance (otherwise significant at the 10% level if
unadjusted), and trade barriers suddenly matter somewhat.
26 Selection criterion: ½ * (real GDPi,1990 + real GDPi, 1999), at constant 1995 US dollars (World Development
Indicators). The cut-off point was arbitrarily set at an average GDP of US$ 60 billion (next in line were Pakistan
($ 58.4 billion) and Peru ($ 50.0 billion)). Taiwan and Hong Kong were excluded owing to data insufficiencies.- 8 -
FDI inflows are measured in constant 1990 US dollars.
27 In anticipation of quantitative results
in section four, note that in the tentative regression for FDIFLOW (see Table 10, Appendix)
size effects contained in the exogenous variables clearly govern the econometric outcome: for
Latin America, only absolute real GDP, in addition to country risk, tested significant. The
Asian sample also exhibits fewer significant variables than if the other and arguably more
meaningful variable FDIGDP is used. Moreover, both regressions exhibit a comparatively low
R-squared.
Apart from log-linearizing FDI stocks, use of normalized FDI variables (FDI inflows as share
of GDP) is relatively widespread in the literature on foreign direct investment. Froot and Stein
(1991), Singh and Jun (1995), Barrell and Pain (1999), Hausmann and Fernández-Arias
(2001), Nookbakhsh et al. (2001), Mody and Murshid (2002) and Razin (2002) use the FDI to
GDP ratio proposed in this study. Similarly, Pistoresi (2000), Chakrabarti (2001) and
Nunnenkamp (2001b) link their FDI variable to host country population, i.e. per-capita FDI,
while Lehmann (1999) computes country shares in total U.S. capital expenditures as an
investment variable. Wheeler and Mody (1992) relate FDI in a given sample country to
investment in an arbitrarily chosen numeraire country. Desai et al. (2003), while incorporating
absolute GDP in their regressions, do not even bother to report the estimates for the market
size variable because of the intuition that larger economies tend to receive greater volumes of
foreign direct investment.
2.1.4 Descriptive Statistics
As Figure 1 shows, developments in the build-up of German FDI positions differed markedly
between the two regions. Emerging from a small base, Asia experienced a pronounced, yet
stable inflow of direct investment in the 1990s that eventually almost closed the huge initial
gap to Latin America, which, partly due to the 1995 Mexican crisis, displays more volatile
FDI flows. This fact corresponds to the fluctuations of global FDI flows to both regions.
28
The fast recovery from the Asian crisis, at least as far as FDI inflows are concerned, has to be
credited to hurried liberalization efforts on the part of crisis countries in the region. For
example, South Korea, formerly hesitant to allow foreign investors to exert a controlling
influence, swiftly opened the economy to FDI after the crisis had hit. Other countries set in
motion a wide range of structural reforms.
29
                                                          
27 According to the adjustment method proposed by Pain (2003), p. 112.
28 See Fernández-Arias and Hausmann (2001), p. 96.
29 For example, Singapore: strengthening of competitiveness, Malaysia: reform of banking system, Thailand and
Indonesia: institutional and regulatory reforms; see Thompson and Poon (2000), pp. 2-3.- 9 -
More importantly, though, reform expectations might have been the driving force behind
rebounding FDI flows: Thompson and Poon (2000), surveying multinational companies
operating in the ASEAN countries, show investors anticipated that reforms would bring about
operational benefits at firm level, likely making the region a more attractive location for sales
and production over the longer term. The long-term orientation of foreign investors taking
controlling stakes in host country firms is the unique quality of FDI, according to
Mallampally and Sauvant (1999), who observe that overall FDI flows to the five most
affected Asian countries declined only slightly in 1997, contrasting sharply with negative
flows for bank lending and portfolio investment. Mody and Murshid (2002) furnish evidence
of the resiliency of FDI flows going to those emerging markets temporarily in distress. For
flows to 60 developing countries between 1981 and 1998, they report a very significantly
positive coefficient for a crisis dummy that captures the interaction between lagged crises and
FDI inflows which points to the persistence of FDI inflows in the aftermath of a crisis relative
to other flows.
30
Within the regions, Latin America displays a relatively stable distribution of German FDI
stocks throughout the 1990s, with Brazil’s startling dominance reaching its maximum of two-
thirds of total German FDI in the mid-1990s and receding thereafter (figure 2).
                                                          
30 See also Nunnenkamp (2001a), pp. 19-21, who reports much higher volatilities of portfolio and other invest-
ment (mostly bank loans) relative to FDI flows to 13 Latin American and Asian nations in the 1980s and 1990s.












1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Years
German FDI Stocks (columns)










German FDI Flows (lines)
(in % of either region’s GDP)
FDI stock Latin America FDI stock Asia FDI/GDP Latin America FDI/GDP Asia- 10 -
In the Asian emerging markets, Singapore’s traditional supremacy gradually gave way to
China’s FDI boom in the latter part of the decade (figure 3). In both regions, the distribution
of FDI stocks is generally quite uneven across countries. This is especially true for Latin
America where Brazil, Mexico and Argentina comprise roughly 90% of German FDI stocks.
Figure 3: Distribution of German FDI Stocks Across Asia

















Figure 2: Distribution of German FDI Stocks Across Latin America
















In the vast FDI literature a great many explanatory variables are employed to explain cross-
border capital flows. Over time, however, a distinctive set of factors frequently used in
econometric modeling has emerged. Lim (2001), surveying the FDI literature, comes up with
a list of seven important factors: size of the host market, agglomeration effects, factor costs,
fiscal incentives, business/investment climate, trade barriers/openness, and economic
distance/transport costs. The latter factor can be neglected in this study as the host countries
included are all located overseas and thus more or less equally far away from the country of
FDI origin, Germany. Theory and empirical evidence on the determinants cited above are
reviewed in the following section (for details on the variables used see table 11, Appendix).
2.2.1 Traditional Variables
Market Size/Level of Income
Among the traditional variables, GDP or GDP per capita is widely used in the literature as a
proxy for market size or purchasing power. Lim (2001) finds market size in terms of the size
of the whole economy (absolute real GDP) or the level of income (GDP per capita) to be the
most robust determinant, although both factors depict quite different market characteristics. In
virtually all the studies surveyed, either indicator of market size is highly positively
significant. This finding is validated by Chakrabarti (2001) for 18 studies in the past 30 years.
Since the endogenous variable is already scaled to GDP and as absolute real GDP, by virtue
of favoring large populations, is a rather poor indicator of market potential, the paper includes
GDP per capita, GDPCAP, following Chakrabarti (2001) who finds this variable strongly
positively related to scaled (per-capita) FDI in an extreme bounds analysis (see section 3.2)
for 135 countries in 1994.
Wage Competitiveness
Cost competitiveness – especially relevant for efficiency-seeking FDI – is probably best
expressed by productivity-adjusted real wages, assuming that labor is largely immobile and
labor costs therefore differ across countries, while other cost drivers such as capital and
intermediate goods are traded on international markets with price-equalizing effects.
31
Moreover, measuring capital productivity is more difficult than deriving unit labor costs, due
                                                          
31 See Turner and Golub (1997), p. 7.- 12 -
to the widespread unavailability of capital stocks at market values and capital goods price
indices as suitable deflators.
32
Among empirical studies, Barrell and Pain (1996) find a much smaller long-run elasticity for
relative capital costs than for relative labor costs. Using unit labor cost indices, the authors
also detect a positive relationship between U.S. unit labor costs relative to those abroad and
the level of outward FDI, i.e. a negative impact of rising relative labor costs seen from the
angle of the host countries. Hubert and Pain (1999) argue that unit labor costs already include
– apart from deviations from average productivity levels – differences in labor quality. For
this reason, Lehmann (1999) negates the necessity of including an educational attainment or
“skill” variable when testing unit labor costs in his regressions. Mody et al. (1999) find for
Japanese FDI in Asia that it is mainly driven by high-quality labor and not merely by cheap
labor abroad, the coefficients of which are, in fact, insignificant. Measuring labor quality by
secondary schooling rates may, as they argue, be misleading, as quality is more related to
industrial experience – i.e. on-the-job performance – rather than formal educational
attainments.
33 Also, one should not underestimate the time lag with which improvements in
school enrollment are manifested in a more productive workforce. Testing for effects of
secondary school enrollment on FDI inflows to 36 developing countries, Noorbakhsh et al.
(2001) report strong significance for this skill variable – but only if productivity-adjusted
wages are excluded from the regression. While educational attainment does seem to matter,
this particular finding leads to the conclusion that a skill variable may not add a great deal of
new information in the presence of labor productivity measures. By contrast, Wheeler and
Mody (1992) and Wei (2000) find a positive relationship between wages (not productivity-
adjusted) and FDI inflows to developing countries.
Here, the wage variable is unit labor costs, ULC, which is defined as the labor costs per
worker in manufacturing divided by the gross value added per worker in manufacturing.
34
Ideally, weighted labor costs for all sectors of the economy should be used, but it is only for
the manufacturing sector that data are available across all countries in the sample. Still, such a
                                                          
32 See Lipsey (2002), p. 36. Barrell and Pain (1996) were forced to leave out the Latin American region due to
lack of reliable time series data on indigenous costs (p. 203).
33 Survey results reported by the authors allegedly indicate that, despite lower secondary enrollment rates, labor
quality in Thailand is higher than in the Philippines.
34 This measure conforms to the definition recommended by the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches
Bundesamt). Yet, there are also other definitions. For example, Turner and Van ‘t dack (1993, pp. 87, 136-137)
compute unit labor costs on the basis of total earnings of labor in manufacturing expressed in US dollars divided
by value added in manufacturing at current prices expressed in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) rates.
This ratio allows for relating labor costs to output per unit of time, with the resulting unit labor costs being
expressed in terms of a common currency. The merit of this approach is that currency fluctuations influencing
the value added are excluded. However, computing unit labor costs on this basis would require data on pure host
country output (i.e. units produced per year) which is generally not available for less developed countries; see
Turner and Van ‘t dack (1993), p. 91.- 13 -
generalization is not uncommon in FDI research.
35 Barrell and Pain (1999) also use
manufacturing unit labor costs for their country-level estimations, and later in their paper run
a separate regression for Japanese FDI flows to manufacturing sectors abroad.
Trade Barriers/Openness of the Economy
Traditionally, direct investment was used by foreign firms to circumvent trade barriers
(“tariff-hopping”) and thus to establish market presence by physically erecting production
facilities or buying existing ones abroad. It has been argued that host country governments
will be more likely to establish trade barriers if a particular domestic industry facing import
penetration is still at an infant stage or if the product life cycle is already beyond the hump.
36
On the other hand, incipient trade restrictions may prompt anticipatory or “quid pro quo”
direct investment. In that sense, the possibility of FDI, or “threat of FDI”, may limit the level
of trade protection that the government can impose.
37 In the past, import protection instituted
by host governments promised such high rates of return to foreign investors that the efficiency
of the subsidiaries was not viewed as a major concern. However, as the majority of emerging
economies have chosen to ease restrictions on imports, so-called “market-seeking” or
“horizontal” direct investment is likely to have fallen over time
38 (greater openness coinciding
with lower FDI inflows), giving way to “efficiency-seeking” or “vertical” direct investment
that requires a liberal trade environment. This newer form of direct investment aims at
exploiting sources of competitiveness such as lower (unit) labor costs, a skilled workforce or
a more conducive business environment.
39 A high degree of openness is required for
stimulating vertical FDI which relies on substantial flows of intermediate inputs and goods in
and out of the host country. In sum, the overall impact of trade barriers is uncertain and
depends on the nature of FDI (horizontal versus vertical) undertaken in each case.
While the case for trade barriers fostering FDI inflows appears quite convincing, the
relationship between traditional openness measures and FDI is less clear. The “natural”
openness or outward orientation of an economy can be thought of as the trade intensity absent
any interventionist policy measures. Thus, the ordinary openness proxy, trade intensity in
                                                          
35 Unit labor costs are not widely available for services despite that sector’s growing importance in emerging
markets; see Turner and Golub (1997), p. 7.
36 See Stehn (1992), p. 73.
37 See Konishi et al. (1999), pp. 290-291.
38 As Nunnenkamp (2001b) notes, FDI was formerly preferred to trade by resource-abundant countries for
accessing large amounts of capital necessary for resource extraction and foreign technical skills unavailable at
home. With the advent of trade liberalization and more integrated financial markets, “resource-seeking” FDI
may have decreased in importance relative to joint ventures or arm’s-length trade deals that make use of growing
domestic expertise (p. 11).
39 See Nunnenkamp (2001b), pp. 12-13, and also Mallampally and Sauvant (1999) who, in addition, list a third
category: “resource/asset-seeking” FDI trying to capture host country advantages in raw materials, skilled labor,
innovative assets or physical infrastructure.- 14 -
terms of either share of imports or exports (or both) in GDP, constitutes a trade flow outcome
measure and is confirmed as being influential for FDI inflows to developing countries by, for
example, Noorbakhsh et al. (2001) and Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2001). However,
Pritchett (1997), Lehmann (1999), and Jost and Nunnenkamp (2002) propose that this type of
openness measure be adjusted for structural, non-policy determinants of trade intensity such
as geographic size, per-capita income or resource endowment.
40 Doing so, Lehmann as well
as Jost and Nunnenkamp find a significantly positive impact of trade openness in panel
estimations for developing countries, whereas Wheeler and Mody (1992) report a negative
correlation of their openness measure (index by Business International) with relative FDI
inflows to manufacturing sectors. At any rate, the overall flow of trade relative to domestic
activity does not reveal the degree of trade distortion caused by other factors.
41
Furthermore, non-tariff barriers, existing in the form of quantitative restrictions, subsidies to
domestic producers, standards and regulations on import good characteristics, government
purchasing policies and arbitrary customs procedures (commonly known as “red tape”), act in
a trade-distorting manner. Evidently, many of the aforementioned incidents are difficult to
measure quantitatively
42; in particular, a cross-country comparison would appear
“forbidding”.
43 While price-impact measures (tariff equivalents, subsidy measures, effective
rates of protection) undertaken by international organizations such as the OECD might
provide an answer, there are numerous data and information problems in isolating the
immediate impact of non-tariff restrictions, largely relating to the influence that market
imperfections and exchange rate fluctuations exert on the price differentials surveyed.
44 Even
if it were possible to comprehensively quantify non-tariff barriers to trade, the severity of the
distortions would not be determined as those restrictions are generally not transparent in their
operation.
45
Pritchett (1997) cautions that none of those openness measures can compare trade policies
both across countries and over time because each of them was constructed to compare
countries during a different time period. This implies that they cannot plausibly used in a
panel setting. Therefore, this study uses as a measure of trade barriers the share of taxes on
international trade in current government revenue, DUTY, whereby a positive coefficient can
be expected for horizontal FDI. This very definition is used by Singh and Jun (1995), who
                                                          
40 The aforementioned authors suggest the use of residuals from a trade intensity regression which employs
structural country characteristics indicating the amount by which a country’s openness differs from that expected
for a country of its size; see, for example, Pritchett (1997), p. 312.
41 See Pritchett (1997), p. 327.
42 Barrell and Pain (1996) rightfully note in this context that “such barriers are notoriously difficult to measure,
especially as the most effective barriers are those that are anticipated but not yet (if ever) implemented” (p. 202).
43 See Pritchett (1997), p. 311.
44 See Baldwin (1989), pp. 9-12.
45 See Pritchett (1997), p. 309.- 15 -
report it as significantly positively correlated to relative FDI inflows for a set of 31
developing countries. A similar measure, namely the average level of tariffs (UNCTAD data),
is tested by Pritchett (1997) in regressions for 72 developing countries. It is the only variable
to be significantly correlated to both the openness measure by Leamer (1988)
46 and an
indicator of non-tariff barriers.
47 In addition, this study checks the validity of a conditioned
openness variable, OPEN, i.e. modified trade intensity measured by the residuals of regressing
the logs of GDP per capita and population on a given host country’s trade intensity (imports
and exports as share of GDP). The coefficient should be positive for vertical FDI.
External Indebtedness
Despite being an important indicator of a country’s solvency often foreshadowing an
imminent financial crisis, measures of foreign indebtedness are used in FDI research less
often than for analyzing other capital flows. At the theoretical level, Ghura and Goodwin
(2000) argue that a rising external debt ratio, indicating a debt overhang, induces economic
agents to anticipate future tax liabilities to service the debt. If the integration of capital
markets is rather low, the ensuing capital flight would then raise the domestic cost of capital.
Apart from conceivable political reverberations, this effect is likely to negatively impact the
overall profitability of foreign subsidiaries. Arguments from corporate finance theory
48 may
be transposed to the macro level in the sense that a relatively high degree of risky debt may
weaken a country’s ability to realize growth possibilities via new investment. A valuable real
option may be forgone if the additional investment and payments to bondholders (in case the
option is exercised) exceed the value of the investment. On the other hand, if the debt level of
the host country is still below a certain level perceived critical by investors, this consideration
may not apply and FDI flows may actually increase with rising external indebtedness.
The aforementioned profitability argument is also put forward by Agarwal et al. (1991) who
in addition advance the notion that unbearable indebtedness may lead to an arbitrary default
on sovereign debt and, subsequently, to expropriations and restrictions on the capital account.
The authors test their hypotheses empirically by including in their estimations for German
FDI to developing countries in the 1980s a variable that proxies debt overhang. For lack of
data on market valuation of emerging market debt, they, methodically questionably, employ
the change in undifferentiated country risk
49 throughout the decade and find that, unlike
                                                          
46 Leamer (1988) constructs both an openness and a trade distortion index that measure deviations from trade
flows predicted by a modified Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek model, using data from 1982.
47 See Pritchett (1997), pp. 318, 320, 324-325. The author uses as indicator or non-tariff barriers the import-
weighted percent of tariff codes lines covered by various types of non-tariff barriers (licenses, quotas,
prohibitions) as a percentage of all tariff code lines within the aggregate (p. 314).
48 See, for example, Myers (1977), and there in particular pp. 155, 164-165.
49 Risk index used is by Institutional Investor. To differentiate the supposed debt overhang variable from the one
used for measuring country risk (see section 2.2.2), in that estimation only sample countries with initially
favorable index ratings were included; see Agarwal et al. (1991), p. 81.- 16 -
foreign investors as a whole, German firms did not restrict their exposure when country
ratings plummeted. Among the few empirical studies to consider the level of external debt,
Pistoresi (2000) reports a significantly negative coefficient for emerging markets’ foreign
debt per capita which is especially relevant for the Latin American sub-sample.
As the measure of external indebtedness carries only a minor weight in the composite PRS
country risk rating (5%), a separate variable, DEBT, measuring the ratio of host country
external debt to GDP, was added to the regressions in recognition of the postulated impact of
rising indebtedness on FDI outcomes.
A further issue in the area of public finances relates to taxation. The case for measuring the
negative influence of high corporate tax rates abroad appears clear: by depressing after-tax
investment returns, high tax rates discourage FDI inflows. The problem with using statutory
tax rates or the share of corporate tax receipts in GDP is that the former is generally biased
upward because of numerous tax exemptions (apart from not being a good variable in a panel
setting because of little variation from year to year) while the latter effectively measures
government collection of taxes in a given year that may differ from the year in which German
companies actually pay their taxes. Moreover, in the taxation literature effective marginal tax
rates incorporating data on statutory corporate tax rates, inflation rates, depreciation
allowances for assets and discount rates for financing are increasingly utilized. The obstacle
to an empirical investigation of the distorting effects of fiscal policy on FDI is that these
marginal tax rates are readily available only for industrialized or at best OECD countries as
the computation of marginal tax rates for developing economies for cross-section applications
is seriously hampered by data availability.
50 Hence, a taxation variable is omitted in this
paper.
2.2.2 Non-Traditional Variables
This section gives an overview of the literature on non-traditional factors, with emphasis on
the research previously undertaken in the area of governance.
Country Risk/Political Risk
Most studies reviewed here control for specific measures of host country political risk. Only
some refer to a broader definition of country risk, as is the case in the aforementioned study
by Jost and Nunnenkamp (2002). For example, Mody/Srinivasan (1998) find a strong
correlation between country safeness (measured by the Institutional Investor index) and host
country share of U.S. FDI outflows by means of the within estimator.
                                                          
50 See Easterly and Rebelo (1993), p. 6, and Mendoza et al. (1994), p. 2.- 17 -
The issue of political risk has attracted more interest among researchers. In a pioneering paper
Schneider and Frey (1985) furnish evidence that in emerging markets political and
socioeconomic factors are relevant on top of the “classical” macro factors. As the authors
show, estimation results for FDI inflows into industrial as well as developing countries are
significantly improved if also controlling for governance variables such as political instability
and the ideological thrust of government. Similarly, Beyer (2002) in a study of transition
countries shows that the fit of his regressions improves when combining both economic and
political variables relating to the base year of transition. The author finds political factors
depicted by the Freedom House Economic Freedom Index or the efficacy of privatization
bureaus to have great explanatory power. Stevens (2000), investigating plant and equipment
spending of U.S. corporations in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, shows that the inclusion of
political factors detrimental to the operations and earnings of U.S. investors – occasional hostile
attitude of government towards FDI, occurrence of a debt crisis, devaluations in a fixed-
exchange-rate system, existence of exchange controls or repatriation restrictions – improves
the regression’s goodness-of-fit for Argentina greatly (R-squared rises from 0.19 to 0.90).
51
“Headline” political risk, or rather the absence thereof, is found to be a driving factor of
developing country FDI inflows by Singh and Jun (1995), who subject a composite variable
merging six internal causes of political risk (as defined by BERI) to econometric testing.
Brunetti and Weder (1997) examine the most prominent uncertainty measures in investment
regressions using the same specifications while holding constant the sample of 60 countries as
well as the time period (1974-1989). They find a number of categories (with individual
variables) – government instability (revolutions), political violence (political executions/war
casualties), political uncertainty (black market premium on foreign exchange, variation of real
exchange rate distortion) – that are consistently significant at least at the 5 percent level and
thus robust to changes in specification. Comparable insights are related by Pfeffermann et al.
(1999) who evaluate survey data covering nearly 4,000 enterprises in 74 countries.
Within the set of political risk measures one can distinguish between corruption alias
administrative deficiencies and governmental instability in the host country. The question of
how devastating corruption can be is investigated by Wei (2000) who evaluates OECD data
on industrial countries’ FDI flows to 45 economies. Higher taxation and higher corruption are
shown to reduce inward FDI by 4.8% and 26%, respectively (using the Business International
risk index). The author asserts that corruption and political stability are negatively correlated,
arguing that corruption may breed public discontent which may eventually topple the
government or alternatively induce short time horizons among officials. Studying the impact
of wide-spread corruption on the rate of private investment in developing countries, Everhart
and Sumlinski (2001) find an indirect negative effect of corruption via the quality of public
                                                          
51 The regression for Brazil shows a lesser improvement; for Mexico the adjustment is only marginally positive.- 18 -
investment. Put differently, any given level of public investment will be characterized by a
higher quality than would be the case with a higher degree of corruption present.
52 As
Lehmann (2002) argues, poor governance introduces asymmetric information, thereby raising
agency costs of market participants incurred in dealing with supervisory agencies.
Consequently, increasing capital costs obstruct inflows of FDI substantially.
Bubnova (2000) contends that corruption acts to prevent democratic development and results
in poor infrastructure. In relating governance to risks facing private infrastructure investment
(measured by spreads of emerging market infrastructure bonds) she identifies four clusters of
strong positive relationships in the set of explanatory variables: in addition to economic
performance and religion-induced tensions, which play a lesser role in the sample countries
here, political factors include regulatory risk (corruption/bureaucratic delays/contract
enforceability) and political disorder risk (domestic conflict/expropriation risk). Corruption
and autocracy risk account for most of the bond spread variation. For a subset of weak-
governance countries the political risk measure has the largest influence on the bond spread,
and the R-squared is significantly higher than for the set of stable countries.
By contrast, Singh and Jun (1995) and Hubert and Pain (1999) fail to find significance for the
occurrence of strikes
53 in developing and non-EU countries, respectively. The same goes for
German FDI flows to developing countries in the 1980s, as shown by Agarwal et al. (1991).
Singh and Jun do, however, report a significantly negative coefficient for strikes in a sub-
sample of “low FDI countries” where standoffs are more frequent.
In light of this overwhelming evidence, the bottom line of research on governance issues is
that high country/political risk does represent an obstacle to higher inflows of FDI capital.
Accordingly, several measures of country and, more specifically, differentiated political risk
are used here. The risk data were obtained from two professional providers of country risk
estimates, the Political Risk Services Group (in short: PRS) with its International Country
Risk Guide
54 and the business magazine Euromoney with its bi-annual country risk surveys.
55
                                                          
52 See also Tanzi and Davoodi (2000), p. 12, who argue that poor public infrastructure due to corruption is likely
to reduce private productivity and thus depress a country’s growth prospects. Interestingly, the authors find that
of 53 countries in the 1990s, those with high corruption tended to have a higher ratio of lawyers to engineers.
Thus, they conclude: “Ceteris paribus, it would seem that a more corrupt society needs more lawyers” (p. 13).
53 Number of work days lost in each of the host countries through strikes (Hubert and Pain) or industrial and
civic strife (Singh and Jun); see Hubert and Pain (1999), p. 173, and Singh and Jun (1995), p. 16.
54 The PRS Group uses estimates based on information collected by its own staff which results in the publication
of 22 variables in three subcategories for 140 countries on a monthly basis. For more information see
http://www.prsgroup.com/commonhtml/methods.html#_International_Country_Risk and, more specifically,
http://www.icrgonline.com/icrgMethods.asp.
55 See, for example, Euromoney (2000), pp. 106-109. As a political risk rating was added only in September
1992, no such variable could be derived from the Euromoney data. The country risk score is calculated using
nine individual, weighted categories; for explanation of the different categories see Euromoney (1997), pp. 60-
62. The individual scores are based on a survey of economists at leading financial and economic institutions.- 19 -
Both indices assign high scores to “safe” countries. Far from being the only sources of
country risk information,
56 these publications enjoy a good reputation among researchers
(ICRG
57 used by Brunetti and Weder (1997), Lehmann (1999), Wei (2000), and Everhart and
Sumlinski (2001); Euromoney data used by Ramcharran (1999) and Jost and Nunnenkamp
(2002)) and supply continuous data for the relevant time period. Inevitably subjective, the
survey data often provide the best information available on the less visible aspects of
governance, and such perceptions are frequently as important as hard-to-obtain evidence.
58
Figure 4 illustrates how country risk in both regions evolved throughout the last decade. Note
that both country risk measures include the respective political risk rating. To isolate genuine
macroeconomic risk, which, incidentally, could also be picked up by the variation in other
variables, the variable PRSERISK was formed. Following the approach of Bubnova (2000)
                                                          
56 As already hinted at, there are in fact many more, such as Freedom House, Business International, Transparency
International, to name just a few professional ones. Furthermore, risk indices have been developed by academics
and international development institutions (such as the World Bank’s Country Policy Institutional Assessment).
Some of the risk indices could not be used in the first place, either because the period covered did not match this
study’s time frame or because the index did not report data for the emerging markets examined in this study.
57 For example, Brunetti/Weder (1997) find PRS’ corruption measure more comprehensive (and more
significant) than that of Business International because the former does not focus on narrow business
transactions but rather “asks whether high government officials are likely to demand special payments and
whether illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government” (p. 14). Conversely,
Wei (2000) criticizes that PRS does not reveal how the ratings are derived (p. 3). The PRS Group itself – at
www.idrgonline.com/icrgMethods.asp – asserts that its measure of corruption is “more concerned with actual or
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding,
and suspiciously close ties between politics and business”.
58 See Bubnova (2000), p. 11. Inherent subjectivity makes comparisons of individual risk assessments difficult,
inspiring Kaufmann et al. (1999) to embark on aggregating indicators from several sources into a meta index.
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described above, in this paper the political risk dimension is further divided into subcategories
of orderly business dealings, i.e. corruption and autocracy risks, called PRSADMIN, and of
political disorder risks, PRSSTAB (see figure 5 for average political risk scores).
59 Grouping
corruption and “red tape” due to their connectivity was brought up by Mauro (1995) as a more
precise measure of corruption than corruption alone.
60
Accordingly, the variable PRSADMIN can be thought of as a measure of administrative
uncertainty surrounding official decisions that immediately affect foreign investors (at the
“micro-level”). It involves subjective assessments of the degree of corruption (with a high
rating meaning a low degree of “sleaze”), the quality of the bureaucracy (high score for
countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic
changes in policy or interruptions in government services), and the so-called investment
profile (measuring risk of expropriation, restrictions on profit repatriation
61 and payment
delays, again with high points for low-risk countries). This exact specification was tested by
Pistoresi (2000) who, as expected, finds a significantly negative relationship between FDI
inflows to a similar set of emerging markets and this combined administrative quality
variable, which, in that case, depicts an inefficient and undependable bureaucracy.
The same result holds true in Pistoresi’s estimations for a measure of political instability.
62 In
this study, the corresponding variable PRSSTAB is composed of “macro-level” factors foreign
firms have to put up with: the stability of the government (assessing both of the government’s
ability to carry out its declared programs and its ability to stay in office), the aspect of law and
order (evaluating the strength and impartiality of the legal system as well as the degree of
popular observance of the law), and the prevalence of internal conflict (the highest rating
being given to countries without armed opposition to the government and absence of arbitrary
governmental violence, direct or indirect, against its own people; lowest rating given to a
country embroiled in an on-going civil war). Figure 5 describes the development of political
risk scores and their sub-components across regions.
                                                          
59 Other subcategories of PRS’ political risk measure – external conflict, socioeconomic conditions, military in
politics, religion in politics, ethnic tensions, democratic accountability – were omitted because they largely
pertain to developing countries and do not seem to play a decisive role in the countries assessed in this study.
60 Wide-spread corruption may lead to further bureaucratic delay as a result of officials “dragging their feet”
until receiving the expected bribe.
61 The issue of repatriation restrictions facing multinational enterprises, a specific facet of political risk, is
touched upon by Ihrig (2000) in a case study of US subsidiaries in Brazil between 1977 and 1991. The model
she employs is able to capture the effect of such restrictions on capital investment and technology transfer to the
Brazilian subsidiaries. Partial remittance restrictions are shown to cause multinationals to remit funds to the
home country, whereas full blocking, logically, prompts reinvestment of funds. However, the Brazilian case
suggests that countries who notoriously impose restrictions or threaten to do so can increase foreign capital
investment if they credibly abolish these restrictions.
62 Made up of six Business International indices; see Pistoresi (2000), p. 41.- 21 -
Agglomeration Effects
There is considerable disagreement in the literature as to what exactly constitutes
agglomeration. Some authors equate clustering effects of that kind with the size of the
existing FDI stock (perhaps lagged) or “herding” of foreign firms, whereas others perceive the
quality of the host country’s infrastructure as a suitable proxy.
63 Positive spillover effects
through the widespread establishment of foreign subsidiaries play a prominent role.
Commonly, once a large multinational corporation sets up shop in one location, others will
quickly follow suit (“follow-the-leader” effect). This is because foreign firms unable to enter
in the same period as the leader does will incur a large welfare loss compared to a scenario
where all firms enter more or less simultaneously. In the extreme, potential late entrants may
not get a foothold in the market because of the productivity advantage already attained by the
first mover.
64 Well-known examples of such positive agglomeration effects are typified by
automobile production in Mexico or the Asian electronics industry
65 as well as high-tech
manufacturing FDI in Ireland.
66
In an innovate study on that issue, Wheeler and Mody (1992) check both factors – clustering
of FDI inflows and quality of the infrastructure – on their validity for 42 developing and
                                                          
63 See Lim (2001), p. 7. As an example for quality-of-infrastructure-proxies, Razin (2002) finds a high positive
significance of developing country telephone density for FDI inflows (p. 10).
64 See Markusen (1990), p. 2
65 See Lim (2001), pp. 5-6.
66 Respondents to a survey among foreign investors in several technology-oriented manufacturing industries
stated that their location decision was influenced by the fact that other key markets were already located in
Ireland; see Barry and Bradley (1997), p. 1804.
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industrialized countries. Both coefficients are of the same magnitude and highly significant
for the manufacturing sector. The quality of infrastructure seems especially important for
developing countries, and specifically the electronics industry. Mody and Srinivasan (1998)
examine data on U.S. FDI to 35 countries and posit that the stock of past FDI is strongly
positively correlated with current FDI inflows in all estimations, whereas the infrastructure
variable (output of electricity per GDP) is found to be significant only if measured by the
“between” estimator, having the authors conclude that only major infrastructure investment
may act to attract investors. Lehmann (1999) uses lagged U.S. total investment as proxy for
agglomeration and finds it to be significantly positive in all regressions. A first-mover effect
is observed by Mody et al. (1999) in a strong partial correlation between a Japanese firm’s
plans to invest in elsewhere in Asia and its expectation of competitors having similar plans.
Braunerhjelm and Svensson (1996) examine agglomeration effects on the industry level,
regressing the relative share of a particular industry in total manufacturing employment. The
results of a Tobit estimation imply that in terms of agglomeration “the more important the
industry of the investing firm is in the host country, the more the firm’s affiliate will produce
in that country” (p. 837) or, interpreted differently, the higher the probability that FDI has
occurred. Agglomeration effects are found to be most pronounced in high-tech industries.
The agglomeration variable used here, AGGLO, is defined as the moving-three year average
of contemporary and lagged total FDI inflows relative to respective host country GDP. Note
that this is not simply a partially lagged endogenous variable since it recurs to FDI flows from
the rest of the world and not just Germany. The variable aims at capturing both first-mover
advantage effects (by including contemporary flows) and the magnitude of privately supplied
infrastructure abroad over the past couple of years.
Corporate Financing Conditions
Rarely used in empirical research, the varying availability of relatively low-cost internal
financing should intuitively play a fundamental role in the magnitude and timing of corporate
investment decisions, particularly with respect to efficiency-seeking FDI. Cushman (1985)
includes a corporate cash flow variable which he lags by one year and finds significantly
positively correlated to U.S. FDI to industrialized countries. Barrell and Pain (1996) add to
their regressions for outward U.S. FDI lagged corporate profits (significantly positive).
The relevance of the level of corporate profits for Germany is underscored by Heiduk and
Hodges (1992) in a case study of the investment activity of German multinationals. The
authors purport that, given the higher volatility of foreign compared to domestic investment,
German firms facing financial distress tend to trim FDI before they decrease domestic
investment.- 23 -
As using cash flows generated within the firm is arguably the most inexpensive way of
financing investment, this study incorporates the lagged aggregated cash flow of German
firms normalized to total corporate assets, CFLOW. Note that there is logically no variation
across host countries such that the variable can be rendered significant only by fluctuations
over time. Put differently, CFLOW resembles a time dummy of changeable magnitude.
Real Exchange Rate (Volatility)
There are opposing views on the impact of the real exchange rate (RER) on FDI inflows. An
upward movement in the host country’s RER may stir fear of protectionism among foreign
investors and lead them to invest abroad in anticipation of additional trade barriers.
67
Conversely, Froot and Stein (1991) show that under credit rationing, i.e. imperfect capital
markets, a (real) exchange rate depreciation induces foreign investors’ wealth to rise, enabling
them to outbid their competitors abroad for information-intensive assets having monitoring
costs. Therefore, aggregate FDI flows will increase in proportion to a depreciation of the
domestic currency.
68 Razin (2002) illustrates a similar wealth effect: foreign firms would be
put at an advantage over domestic borrowers by being able to post more valuable collateral in
borrowing from domestic banks.
69 Yet, as Ghura and Goodwin (2000) point out, the overall
impact of a real depreciation is uncertain, as imported inflation raises the price of investment
goods and consequently depresses investment.
70 In the arguably most relevant empirical
investigation on exchange rate volatility with respect to this study, Goldberg and Klein (1997)
find that a depreciation in the bilateral RER of large Asian countries to the yen attracts FDI
inflows from Japan while FDI from the U.S. falls. Interestingly, U.S. flows do not react to
changes in the bilateral RER to the dollar,
71 nor are there significant effects for the Latin
American sub-sample. To avoid colinearity with the unit labor cost variable,
72 the main model
forgoes a particular exchange rate variable in levels.  However, the significance of the
bilateral real exchange rate, RER, is tested in a separate regression excluding labor costs.
                                                          
67 See Kosteletou and Liargovas (2000), p. 139
68 See Froot and Stein (1991), p. 1202. This shift in relative wealth is caused by nominal exchange rate
movements that not matched by domestic price level adjustments, rendering deviations from purchasing power
parity possible.
69 This effect naturally applies mostly to mergers and acquisitions and less to greenfield investment. However,
the latter can be expected to grow, too, as (nominal) exchange rate depreciations – according to the “relative
labor cost theory” – give foreign production a competitive edge in labor costs over domestic output and will thus
lead to higher FDI inflows; see Kosteletou and Liargovas (2000), p. 139, and Goldberg and Klein (1997), p. 12.
70 Generally speaking, a widely-perceived deviation of the real exchange rate from its estimated equilibrium
level may affect long-run investment decisions via a shift in relative production costs; see Barrell and Pain
(1996), p. 202.
71 This may be due to the fact that real and nominal exchange rates of the sample countries were closely related
as the observed weight of the US dollar in Asian currency baskets was often between 90 and 100 percent; see
Goldberg and Klein (1997), p. 21. Hence, movements in RER to the dollar were either caused by very strong
shifts in exchange rates to other currencies within the basket or by bilateral inflation differentials.
72 This would expressly apply to those countries with fixed exchange rate regimes or de facto nominal exchange
rate stability over the sample period.- 24 -
It is, however, quite justified to look beyond pure level effects. The expectation of short-term
changes in exchange rates may influence the timing of investment transactions: for example,
firms may precipitate payments in currencies expected to appreciate.
73 In the area of exchange
rate volatility, several theoretical studies show that higher variability is positively correlated
with outward direct investment flows (Cushman (1985), Aizenman (1991, 1992)
74, Goldberg
and Kolstad (1995), and Sung and Lapan (2000)). In a theoretical model based on the view
taken in the real options literature, Sung and Lapan demonstrate that by erecting more than
one production facility, i.e. opening another plant abroad, and postponing the decision as to
where to produce, a multinational firm acquires a real option whose value increases with
greater exchange rate fluctuations.
75 They posit that more volatile exchange rates induce the
relative value of opening the foreign plant to rise. This contradicts the traditional view that
firms would then reconsider foreign investment to reduce their risk exposure.
76 Depending on
the degree of volatility, firms will open only the foreign plant or both.
77 Therefore, high
exchange rate variability will promote FDI outflows to alternative production sites.
This hypothesis is confirmed by several empirical studies. Stockman and Vlaar (1996)
observe that higher exchange rate volatility significantly increases the growth rate of Dutch
FDI outflows.
78 A similar result is found by Hubert and Pain (1999) who test both real and
nominal exchange rate fluctuations separately for German data and find that nominal
exchange rate volatility negatively impacts FDI outflows, whereas the reverse holds for the
real exchange rate. The latter finding is, as the authors point out, consistent with the
production shifting hypothesis. Love and Lage-Hidalgo (2000), testing whether past volatility
in the US$-peso rate affects FDI flows to Mexico, also report a strongly positive coefficient.
79
In this study, exchange rate volatility is therefore modeled along the lines of Hubert and Pain
(1999) by constructing a two-year moving average of past real exchange rate fluctuations. It
is important to note that, contrary to some of the previously mentioned studies that simply
                                                          
73 See Barrell and Pain (1996), p. 205.
74 Aizenman (1992) shows that under a flexible exchange rate higher volatility of monetary shocks induces
disparities in the real wage at home and abroad, and thus induces geographic diversification via foreign direct
investment, while concurrently lowering aggregate investment (pp. 909, 914).
75 The real option’s value is calculated as the expected value of additionally opening the plant abroad, i.e. value
of the firm with both plants exclusive of the value of merely the home plant, minus the sunk cost incurred by
opening the foreign plant. It is shown that the differential profits increase with higher exchange rate volatility;
see Sung and Lapan (2000), p. 415, and, similarly on the real options argument, Aizenman (1992), p. 897.
76 See Goldberg and Kolstad (1995), pp. 856-857.
77 See Sung and Lapan (2000), p. 415.
78 The authors do not specify whether they test nominal or real exchange rate fluctuations.
79 Furthermore, Barrell and Pain (1996) find that an expectation of a depreciation in the host country’s currency
will postpone US investment. Cushman (1985) reports rising U.S. FDI to G7-countries in response to an increase
in the standard deviation of the expected change in the real exchange rate. By contrast, Sin and Leung (2001) do
not find a strong impact of the nominal exchange rate on flows to developing countries up to 1992.- 25 -
first-difference the exchange rate, here volatility is measured as the variance of the indexed
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where RERi,t is the real exchange rate between Germany and the i
th country in a given year.
80
Structural Reforms
Recent studies have been increasingly incorporating structural reform measures in FDI host
countries. The intuition is that current or envisaged reforms in the regulatory realm will
positively affect investment conditions for foreign firms over the longer term. However,
during such adjustment periods FDI flows may actually dwindle, as is shown by Tuman and
Emmert (1999) for Japanese FDI in 12 Latin American countries for the period 1979-1992.
During a given year of implementing economic adjustments, the sample countries received an
average of roughly $30 million less in FDI. Agarwal et al. (1991) fail to find a positive impact
of lagged World Bank adjustment loans on total German FDI flows to developing countries.
A genuine measure of structural reform has been developed by Lora (2001, drawing on earlier
work of 1997). This unique meta-index for Latin American countries consists of five
subcategories (trade, financial, tax and labor market reforms, and privatization) measured by
individual indices and now covers the period from 1985 to 1999. Lora himself does not
subject his data to econometric testing, but Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2001) do so,
exploring how structural effects, which the index measures, relate to growth in Latin America
up to 1995. Reassuringly, they find that Lora’s structural policy index contains independent
information not already captured by four other stabilization regressors.
81 In fact, the index’s
coefficient is significantly positive and eliminates the unexplained excess of Latin American
growth (low growth despite reforms)
82 observed in their baseline regressions. To test whether
this holds true for the impact of structural reforms on FDI flows, Lora’s recently updated
index, called STRUCT, is included in the estimations for the Latin American sub-sample.
                                                          
80 Real exchange rates computed using consumer price indices. The RER itself is normalized to base year 1990.
An increase in the RER denotes a real appreciation of the host country’s currency. The variances are measured as
the squared annual differences relative to the previous year. One could have used unit labor costs as indicator of
the real exchange rate as proposed by Hubert and Pain (1999, p. 174) but doing so would mean neglecting
changes in the nominal exchange rate and thus a greater degree of noise; see Barrell and Pain (1996), p. 202.
81 These are: lower public consumption (relative to GDP), lower inflation, financial deepening (broad money to
GDP), exchange rate unification (black market premium), and, allegedly, trade intensity (imports and exports to
GDP, estimates not given); see Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2001), pp. 526, 529.
82 This often-voiced “puzzle” is discarded by the authors “in the sense that unidentified region-specific factors
depressed growth in Latin America during the 1990s, offsetting the large positive growth impetus of the
reforms”. They conclude that “the growth response of recent reform in Latin America – that is, its marginal
effect – was adequate”; Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2001), pp. 543, 535.- 26 -
3. Methodology
In the following sections, the estimation method selected for the study is described, followed
by a presentation of the procedure of selecting robust variables and, finally, the econometric
results at both the country and industry level.
3.1 Estimation Method
In principle, the parameters for each country could be estimated, however inefficiently, by
ordinary least squares (OLS). Given the geographic proximity of the countries in question to
one another, it would be a strong assumption that each cross section behaves entirely
independent of the others, particularly given the fact that the model assigns the same
parameter vector to all units (countries).
83 Therefore, the error terms in the FDI equations are
likely to include factors common to all sample countries and thus to be correlated between
cross sections at a given time. This supposition renders a pooled analysis of FDI data using
the SUR
84 estimation method more efficient than applying OLS to each country separately
since the common, immeasurable influences are accounted for. The SUR technique allows for
integrating contemporaneous correlation by estimating the full variance-covariance matrix of
the system’s disturbance vector. This, of course, requires that the panel be balanced. Another
prerequisite for using SUR estimation is that T be greater than N, otherwise the feasible GLS
estimator cannot be calculated.
85
To obtain general results for each region, only one coefficient per regressor is estimated (and





















































































Under the assumption that the disturbances are uncorrelated across observations, the
disturbance system becomes:
86
                                                          
83 See Greene (2003), p. 333.
84 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. For a good overview on SUR techniques see Dielman (1989), pp. 29-47,
Judge et al. (1988), pp. 444-468, or Greene (2003), pp. 340-362.
85 See Greene (2003), p. 322. Larger sets of countries will therefore usually preclude using the SUR technique
which fortunately is not the case in this study as T=10 (years) and N=6 or N=8 (countries).
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where n and m denote the nth and mth equation, respectively, and I is the T× T identity matrix.
As can be inferred from (III), the individual equations are linked only by their disturbances,
hence “seemingly unrelated regressions.” An efficiency gain exists because the pooling
approach takes account of correlation between the error vectors and uses information on
explanatory variables included in the system but excluded from the individual equation.
87 The
greater the correlation of the disturbances, the greater the efficiency gain obtained by applying
GLS. The GLS estimator in the SUR case, therefore, is:
[] . ˆ y V X X V X β 1 1 1 − − − ′ ′ = (IV)
In addition, the SUR estimation with STATA provides for including a first-order
autoregressive (AR(1)) process. In this case, the original data are transformed by adding to the
residuals a lagged and weighted error term such that
it t i i t i u +     = − 1 , , ε ρ ε (V)
which amounts to multiplying the variance-covariance matrix V by the transformation matrix
Pi  that removes the autocorrelation of the errors. Alternatively, only one common AR(1)
coefficient ρ  may be estimated. With these, the SUR estimation method does, in a sense,
contain dynamic elements which would substitute for a full-fledged dynamic estimation if,
say, the common AR(1) coefficient were sufficiently small (less than 0.2, for example).
Therefore, FDI panel data may be estimated by a static model if the influence of lagged
coefficients and thus the dynamics of the source data are shown to be weak.
To test whether the off-diagonal elements of V are indeed non-zero, a likelihood ratio test,
which is based on the likelihood ratio statistic
88
) ˆ log ˆ (log ) log (log 2 u r u r T L L W W − = − − = λ  (VI)
                                                          
87 See Judge et al. (1988), p. 450.
88 See Greene (2003), p. 349. A similar test of the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is performed for each
regression based on:  () 
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being the number of groups across which heteroskedasticity may occur; see Greene (2003), p. 236.- 28 -
is used, where Wr and Wu are the residual sums of squares and cross-product matrices using
the constrained and unconstrained estimators, respectively. The likelihood ratio statistic is
asymptotically  χ
2-distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the number of imposed
restrictions.
In sum, the SUR model allows for contemporaneous correlation of disturbances as well as
first-order autocorrelation of the time series disturbances and cross-sectional
heteroskedasticity. The log likelihood function will be instrumental in arriving at the correct
specification of the final model, as will be shown in section four.
3.2 Selection of Variables
Section 2.2 has illustrated that a wide variety of potential exogenous variables have been
tested in the literature. While the merits of using a theoretical model as a basis for estimating
determinants of direct investment are obvious, this study nonetheless employs an ad-hoc
estimation, which tests an array of variables that in the literature have previously been found
to be crucial for FDI flows. The problem of converting structural approaches to modeling FDI
into testable hypotheses lies primarily in the scarcity of economic data in developing
countries, both across years and types of determinants. This shortcoming has led authors
pursuing such an approach (inter alia, Lehmann (1999) and Stevens (2000)) to simplify their
models, as the variables contained in the structural models were not readily available and thus
needed to be substituted by proxy variables in the subsequent regressions. Hence, while most
researchers would agree that apart from classical macroeconomic variables one has to account
for location factors such as agglomeration effects or idiosyncratic “political” risks pertaining
to the maintenance of property rights, it is less clear exactly which of these factors belong in
the true regression in any one case.
Although ad-hoc estimations are used here, the approach to selecting the model variables is
nonetheless structural in the sense that only those variables are that are found to be robust in
an iterative procedure based on the Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA), originally suggested by
Leamer (1983, 1985), are included in the final model. This test, as modified by Levine and
Renelt (1992), defines those variables of interest, z, as robust if, in a regression of the form
ε β β β α γ   + + + +   = ∗ ∗ ∗ j xj zj yj j x z y  ,( V I I )
they are always significant when combined with each of the other variables, with y being a
vector of fixed (“free”) variables that are always included and xj a vector of up to three
variables taken from the pool of N variables. The EBA performs alterations in this subset xj to- 29 -
find the widest range of coefficient estimates on the variables of interest z, which is then
defined as robust if the lower extreme bound, being the lowest value of β zj− 2σ zj (slope
parameter minus two times the standard deviation), and the corresponding upper extreme
bound, β zj+2σ zj, are either both negative or both positive.
89 In other words, a statistical
relationship between the FDI flow variable and a variable of interest z is deemed robust if the
latter remains statistically significant at the five percent level with an unchanged sign when
the conditioning set of variables is subjected to changes (see figure 6, Appendix, for further
clarification). Otherwise, one has reason to lack confidence in the relationship with the
endogenous variable. Such a variable of interest is to be called “fragile” because it does not
display enough independent variation to explain cross-country differences in FDI.
90
The method used in this study to arrive at the regression γ  differs from the proposed approach
in that there is no vector of commonly used (fixed) variables in FDI research,
91 with the
exception of market size, usually proxied by GDP or GDP per capita. The lack of universally
acknowledged standard regressors thus calls for preselecting fixed variables, much in the
same fashion as proposed for choosing the variables of interest, z. Accordingly, the set of
fixed variables must first be determined by running the EBA solely with the variable of
interest and the conditioning information set. In some cases this initial procedure will turn out
only one robust variable in the “first round”, which is then set as a fixed variable in the next
round of regressions in order to find another variable that by virtue of this inclusion now
becomes robust as well. Now having a “critical mass” of regressors in place, these two
variables – not three, given the rather limited number of conditioning factors – will then be
used in a “full” EBA to detect more robust factors.
Because of the normalization of the endogenous variable by relating it to GDP, market size
has effectively been rendered negligible and thus GDPCAP  is included to control for
purchasing power in the host country. Even so, this variable should not routinely be assumed
to be one of the fixed variables but must also be subjected to the Extreme Bounds Analysis.
                                                          
89 See Sala-i-Martin (1997), pp. 2-4. The author criticizes this test as too strong because only one regression in
which the coefficient sign changes suffices to reject the variable in question, thereby almost guaranteeing that all
of the variables tested are labeled as non-robust. He suggests to consider the distribution of the β z and use the
fraction of the cumulative distribution function lying of each side of zero as robustness criterion. In the present
study, however, the Extreme Bounds Analysis turns out to work nicely in accepting only a narrow number of
truly robust variables.
90 See Chakrabarti (2001), pp. 93-95.
91 Mauro (1995) applies the Levine/Renelt approach and a similar one by Barro (1991) to growth rates of
investment to GDP and includes as fixed variables GDP, population growth and secondary education. The two
latter ones are, however, clearly non-standard in the FDI literature.- 30 -
4. Econometric Results
4.1 Country Level
Following a “general-to-specific” approach, first a model that includes all explanatory
variables is estimated. Subsequently, the list of variables is narrowed down to the ones found
robust in the Extreme Bounds Analysis. In addition, alternative variables for risk, cost, and
openness measure are estimated separately. The estimation outcome contains standardized
coefficients β j
* = β j (sxj/sy) with sxj being the standard deviation of the j
th exogenous variable
and sy the standard deviation of the endogenous variable.
92 As a double-log linear model
allowing the coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities was not feasible due to the occurrence
of negative FDI flows, this standardization allows for comparing the “weights” with which
the individual variables enter the equation. The measure of goodness-of-fit has to be derived
from the Wald test statistic and is therefore usually called “pseudoR
2”.
93
The regression results for Latin America in table 1 provide a number of valuable insights.
Most importantly, it is shown that country risk clearly matters in the region. Both risk indices,
PRSCRISK in (1) and EMCRISK in (2), are strongly significant with the expected sign and carry
the greatest weight among the explanatory variables. Further decomposition of the risk aspect
reveals that the economic risk measure, PRSERISK, if chosen instead of headline country risk
is strongly positively significant and robust (coefficient = 0.3132, z-ratio = 4.68); upper
bound: 0.0156, lower bound: 0.0068) as opposed to PRSPRISK (ß = 0.0606, z = 0.84). Among
the political risk components, the index of administrative quality, PRSADLEA (replacing
headline political risk) is significant and correctly signed (ß = 0.2084, z = 2.37), whereas
PRSSTAB, measuring domestic stability, is negatively correlated with FDI inflows.
Second, German FDI in that region seems to have been geared towards tapping markets
protected against imports
94 over the sample period since the tariff variable, DUTY, is robustly
positively significant while ULC, an indicator of efficiency-seeking FDI, is not. In addition,
agglomeration effects have clearly spurred German FDI flows with a view to securing market
access in the face of strong competition from abroad. An alternative model (3) using the real
exchange rate, RER, and the conditioned openness measure, OPEN, instead of unit labor costs
                                                          
92 For further reference see Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981), pp. 90-91.
93 See Greene (2003), p. 97, for derivation. Verbeek (2001), p. 182, discussing alternative measures to R
2, makes
use of the likelihood ratio statistic (LR) which is asymptotically equivalent to the Wald test statistic (W). The
Wald (or F-) statistic is related to pseudoR
2 as follows:
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94 For additional evidence (on the strategy of the German automobile industry) see Nunnenkamp (1998), p. 22.- 31 -
and taxation of trade, respectively, worsens the fit of the regression compared to (1) as both
alternative variables end up being insignificant.
Table 1: LATIN AMERICA; Country Level
FGLS estimation, with individual country effects, heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation
Dependent variable: FDIGDP; number of observations: 60
























































2 0.65 0.41 0.40 0.54
Note: z-values in parentheses; ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level
An unexpected result is found for Lora’s structural reform index: contrary to the intuition,
STRUCT, turns out to be robust (z-value: -4.75) if added to regression (1), and its inclusion
improves the regression’s fit considerably (pseudoR
2 rises to 0.75), leaving room for
interpretation. Coinciding with the results of Tuman and Emmert, current crisis conditions
might overshadow structural reforms whose beneficial impact may only take root in later
periods.
95 However, lagging STRUCT by one period does not change the picture greatly (it
remains significantly negative at the 1 percent level). Closer inspection of the data series
reveals that there is a persistent improvement in index scores for almost all of the Latin
                                                          
95 On the other hand, as illustrated in section 1, even expectations of structural reforms suffice to prompt
investment decisions. Therefore, one can expect actual reforms depicted in the index to contemporaneously
affect decision-making.- 32 -
American sample countries which contrasts sharply with the relatively high volatility of
German FDI flows to the region. The negative correlation between FDI and the reform index
could also owe something to the fact that index scores rose excessively in the early 1990s
when a wave of privatization set in. This is true of all sample countries with the exception of
Chile, whose privatization had already begun in the early 1980s.
96 Soaring scores are,
however, not mirrored by German FDI flows to the region in the early 1990s, presumably
because German firms participated less in the privatization process than did investors from
other nations.
97
The parsimonious “final” regression (4) shows that of the eight original variables, only three
are robust according to the Extreme Bounds Analysis (see table 2). PRSCRISK and AGGLO
having been selected by the initial procedure
98 as the two fixed variables, the following EBA
produces only one more robust variable, namely DUTY. For Asia, the case is more clear-cut:
ULC and DUTY test robust in the initial procedure, and subsequently CFLOW is found to be the
only truly robust variable in addition.
Table 2: Extreme Bounds Analysis – Country Level
Fixed variables: Latin America – PRSCRISK, AGGLO; Asia – ULC, DUTY.
Regressions include the fixed variables plus one of those listed below (variables of interest) and three
of the pool of remaining variables at a time. Bounds are derived from non-standardized coefficients.
LATIN AMERICA ASIA
Variable      Upper bound  Lower bound       Variable         Upper bound         Lower bound
ULC 0.3739 -0.1769 PRSCRISK 0.0645 -0.0015
DUTY 
† 0.0236 0.0016 GDPCAP 0.0876 -0.0197
DEBT 0.0026 -0.0057 DEBT 0.0033 -0.0003
GDPCAP 0.0934 -0.5008 AGGLO 0.0045 -0.0420
CFLOW 0.0244 -0.0272 CFLOW 
† 0.0313 0.0019
RERVOL 0.2164 -0.0890 RERVOL 0.0700 -0.0454
† denotes robust variable as defined by the Extreme Bounds Analysis (in addition to the fixed variables listed above)
Regarding country risk, the outcome of the estimations for Asia paints a similar picture to the
Latin American case (see the following table):
                                                          
96 See Birch and Braga (1993), pp. 122-123 and 126.
97 See Nunnenkamp (1998), pp. 25-26.
98 In fact, in the “first round” only PRSCRISK is found to be robust, while AGGLO (upper bound: 0.0525, lower
bound: -0.0069 with PRSCRISK as the free variable) is the variable clearly “next in line” in terms of consistency.
AGGLO is nonetheless a robust variable since an EBA using PRSCRISK and DUTY as fixed variables to bring
about a critical mass of regressors now yields two positive bounds for AGGLO (upper: 0.0486, lower: 0.0021).- 33 -
Table 3: ASIA; Country Level
FGLS estimation, with individual country effects, heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation
Dependent variable: FDIGDP; number of observations: 80
  (5) (6) (7) (8)























































2 0.79 0.70 0.86 0.75
Note: z-values in parentheses; ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level
Again, both risk measures are significantly positive, with EMCRISK in this case being
marginally more significant but likewise worsening the fit of the regression slightly.
However, PRSCRISK is not a truly robust variable (minor violation of EBA, see table 2) and is
thus omitted from the parsimonious regression in (8). The question as to what accounts for the
non-robustness is answered by testing for the other risk sub-components. Even though, at
first glance, PRSERISK is (with ß = 0.2936 and z = 4.70) as significant as in the Latin American
sub-sample, it fails the EBA by a small margin (upper: 0.0085, lower: -0.0002) and as a result
is, strictly speaking, non-robust. Headline political risk is again insignificant (PRSPRISK: ß =
0.0059, z = 0.98) while its sub-component PRSADMIN carries the expected positive sign (ß =
0.2324, z = 7.45) and, as opposed to Latin America, tests robust (upper: 0.0061, lower:
0.0009). Lastly, aspects of political stability cannot be shown to play a major role in the Asian
sample countries  (PRSSTAB: ß = -0.0597, z  = -1.21).- 34 -
Another important finding is that for Asia the signs of the coefficients for ULC and DUTY are
reversed in comparison to Latin America, as both are significantly (robustly) negative. These
results are clearly in line with the efficiency-seeking hypothesis as FDI in the Asian emerging
markets was indeed driven by low costs and open borders to trade (OPEN significant and
correctly signed in (7)). This interpretation is backed by the strong results for CFLOW, implying
that the availability of low-cost financing does matter for investments in emerging Asia.
Interestingly,  AGGLO carries an unexpected negative sign. Evidence from the data series
suggests that German multinationals tended to exhibit a counter-cyclical investment behavior.
In some country cases they were the front-runners, well ahead of investments by the rest of
the world. In others, they apparently “missed the boat”, gaining access to markets much later
than the average foreign investor. Finally, German companies reacted to the Asian crisis in a
much more volatile manner than did other investors. At any rate, the agglomeration variable is
not robust against the inclusion of other variables in the Asian case. The positive coefficient
of DEBT should not come as a surprise considering the arguments put forward in section 2.2.1,
because foreign debt ratios were lower on average and thus less critical than in Latin America.
Specification tests for the imposed restrictions – individual country effects, heteroskedastic
error terms, cross-sectional correlation and within-group autocorrelation – were run one by
one, with each additional restriction being compared to the one marginally less restrictive
(e.g. merely heteroskedastic error terms). The statistics of the likelihood ratio test (see section
3.1 for derivation) of no individual country effects, solely homoskedastic error terms and no
cross-sectional correlation consistently exceeded the critical values for the χ
2-distribution,
thus rejecting the null hypotheses. However, the hypothesis of no autocorrelation could not be
rejected, corresponding to the result that ρ  was generally less than 0.10.
To check whether regional country sample ought to be estimated separately, a t-test is applied
to the sub-samples of Latin America (superscript: 1) and Asia (superscript: 2) , see equation (VIII)
below. To test the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are identical, the t-statistic
) ˆ ( ) ˆ (
ˆ ˆ
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is put to use.
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= ; see Greene (2003), p. 51.- 35 -
If the absolute t-ratio is larger than 1.96, the null hypothesis of equal coefficients is rejected,
implying that separate, i.e. region-wide, testing is called for.










* denotes rejection of hypothesis
The finding that the test statistics for four out of eight variables are strongly significant (see
table 4) indicates that estimating FDI flows to the two continents separately is indeed the
appropriate procedure. The clearly insignificant t-ratios for the three remaining variables are
due to non-robustness of the variables themselves in both regional cases (GDPCAP, DEBT,
RERVOL) and should be disregarded accordingly.
4.2 Sector Level
Making use of the firm-level data available in the Bundesbank FDI stock statistics, the above
country-level regressions are re-estimated for the manufacturing sector and several of its sub-
industries to check for the influence of sectoral GDP per capita, and sectoral labor costs, and
in the case of sub-sectors, the relationship between capital intensity and political risk. While it
would have been interesting to investigate other sectors of the economy such as agriculture or
services, data on labor costs in those sectors are available only for some sample countries.
4.2.1 Manufacturing Sector
Inevitably, econometric work on individual emerging market industries suffers from scarcity
of comparable sectoral data. Apart from the unit labor costs already utilized in the previous
regressions, manufacturing GDP abroad and sector-specific cash flows of investing German
manufacturers are the only readily accessible data at the industry level. As there was no- 36 -
compelling reason to exclude individual country-level factors, the whole set of remaining
“global” variables was included to control for economy-wide effects. Again, an Extreme
Bounds Analysis was performed to identify robust variables (see table 5).
Table 5: Extreme Bounds Analysis – Manufacturing
Fixed variables: Latin America – GDPCAP, PRSCRISK; Asia – GDPCAP, AGGLO.
Regressions include the fixed variables plus one of those listed below (variables of interest) and three
of the pool of remaining variables at a time. Bounds are derived from non-standardized coefficients.
LATIN AMERICA ASIA
Variable  Upper bound     Lower bound      Variable      Upper bound       Lower bound
ULC 1.4634 -3.6386 PRSCRISK 0.0036 -0.0102
DUTY 0.1184 -0.0866 ULC
† -0.1963 -0.9032
DEBT 2.5657 -3.0846 DUTY
† -0.0047 -0.0278
AGGLO 0.4667 -0.0701 DEBT 0.1113 -0.4024
CFLOW 0.1125 -0.2455 CFLOW 
† 0.1012 0.0393
RERVOL 1.4781 -0.3341 RERVOL 0.0063 -0.3311
† denotes robust variable as defined by the Extreme Bounds Analysis (in addition to the fixed variables listed above)
By and large, the estimation results for the whole manufacturing sector (see table 6) do not
differ greatly from those found at the country level. Again, the PRS country risk variable
turns out to be robustly positive for the Latin American sub-sample, being joined in this
respect by GDPCAP (significantly negative), while AGGLO and DUTY lose their previous
significance. For Asia, all variables found robust at the country level as well as AGGLO and
GDPCAP pass the robustness check for the manufacturing sector. Interestingly, while PRSCRISK
and RERVOL now display a negative sign for that region, GDPCAP becomes highly significantly
positive, carrying by far the greatest weight in the regressions. The joint significance of unit
labor costs and per-capita GDP indicates that while “cheap labor” is an important determinant
of FDI flows from Germany, the Asian manufacturing market is an attractive location for
German investors in its own right.
Specification tests yielded results comparable to those at the country level, except for the one
on autocorrelation in the Latin American sample. For regressions (9) and (10), the hypothesis
of no autocorrelation in the residuals was rejected – a logical result given a common AR(1)
coefficient of ρ = -0.201. Accordingly, the estimations for the Latin American sample include
the aforementioned adjustment mechanism to incorporate first-order autocorrelation.- 37 -
Table 6: LATIN AMERICA / ASIA: Manufacturing
FGLS estimation, with individual country effects, heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation
Dependent variable: FDISEC; number of observations: 60 / 80
Variable LATIN AMERICA ASIA
















































2 0.32 0.32 0.97 0.86
Note: z-values in parentheses; ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level
4.2.2. Sub-Sectors in Manufacturing
It has been argued that capital-intensive industries – measured by fixed investment per
employee – are more sensitive to shifts in political risks because of considerable plant-
specific sunk costs. Agarwal et al. (1991, p. 85) contend that “the risk of selective
expropriation is related to the technological diversity of FDI that renders industry-specific
factors important for the expropriation decision.” Lehmann (1999, p. 20), studying the capital
expenditures of U.S. affiliates in the chemical and electronics sectors of lower-income
countries, finds that the coefficient of political risk is larger for the relatively capital-intensive
chemical industry. This finding along with other evidence
100 appears to be consistent with the
real option theory that stipulates the negative influence of an restrictive investment regime on
investment decisions of foreign investors. According to Lehmann’s model, investors face an
incentive to delay an investment abroad the greater the taxes on local production and the
higher the probability of a reversal of initial investment liberalization. Therefore, a credible
                                                          
100 Among studies of sectoral FDI flows, Froot and Stein (1991) find negative correlations between FDI inflows
to 13 US separate industries and the real value of the US dollar. The result for the (capital-intensive) chemical
industry turns out to be the strongest within the manufacturing sector.- 38 -
policy with regard to maintaining a favorable investment environment is needed to stimulate
firm owners to go ahead with sizable capital expenditures. Viewed from this angle, it is clear
that political risk will exert a negative stimulus to investment in cases of large entry costs in
terms of outlays for plant construction.
101 On the other hand, so-called footloose industries
such as electronics with comparatively low set-up costs and, correspondingly, high locational
flexibility will favor a cost-efficient production environment, i.e. good infrastructure and low
labor costs. In turn, as such investment is vertical in nature and re-export of assembled
products is intended, host country market size or purchasing power should be of secondary
importance.
102
German firm-level investment data confirm Lehmann’s observation of sizable differences in
capital endowment per worker, as can be inferred from the following table:
Table 7: Capital Intensity of German Manufacturing Industries in the Sample Countries
Region Industry Average fixed assets per worker
          (thousands of DM)
Latin America Chemicals (CHE) 71,230
Information/communication technologies (ICT)
103 33,632
Machinery and equipment (MAE) 43,586
Asia Chemicals (CHE) 73,012
Information/communication technologies (ICT)
103 35,553
Machinery and equipment (MAE) 29,449
Thus, the chemical sector is compared to each of the other two industries in terms of the
significance of the appropriate political risk variable. Here, PRSADMIN is selected because it
depicts the occurrence of unfavorable action by the host country’s authorities to the
immediate detriment of investors. Worsening scores should act as a deterrent to FDI flows of
capital-intensive industries. Along the lines of the above sector estimations, regressions are
run for the three sub-sectors listed above, using as controls the same country-level exogenous
variables with the exception of sub-sector cash flows and wages. Unit labor costs had to be
replaced by real wages as information on sub-sector productivity was not available.
104
                                                          
101 See Lehmann (1999), p. 9.
102 See Wheeler and Mody (1992), p. 69.
103 Including the sub-sector “Manufacturing of equipment for the production and distribution of electricity”.
104 This certainly represents a limitation, and at first glance this bias seems to enter into the results of the sub-
sector regressions for Latin America with RWAGE being significantly positive in each case (see table 8).
However, tentative regressions for Latin America (not shown here) incorporating real wages adjusted for overall
growth of value added in manufacturing (i.e. not differentiated by sub-sector, which also adds a certain bias) did
not reveal major differences to the regressions reported in table 8: the coefficients of RWAGE for CHE and MAE- 39 -
The regression results in tables 8 and 9 confirm the hypothesis that investors in capital-
intensive industries react more decisively to variations in the investment climate than do those
in the more labor-intensive information/communication technology (ICT) sector. In both
regions, the regression coefficients on administrative risk confirm the postulated differences
between chemical and the other two sectors, perhaps with the seeming exception of ICT in
Latin America for which the coefficient is significant at the 5 % level. Still, the hypothesis
holds as the standardized beta coefficient for the chemical sector is twice as high as the one
for ICT, apart from the slight difference in significance levels. The results for MAE
consistently conform to the hypothesis with the outcome being insignificant in both cases. No
clear pattern emerges for the other control variables which may owe something to the
possibility that country-level variables may not pick up characteristics of the sub-sectors.
Table 8: Sub-Sector Level – LATIN AMERICA
FGLS estimation, with individual country effects, heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation
Dependent variable: FDISUBSEC; number of observations: 60



















































2 0.61 0.36 0.31
Note: z-values in parentheses; ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level
                                                                                                                                                                                    
kept their positive significance levels, and only the coefficient for ICT, while remaining positive, turned
insignificant.
105 As in regressions (9) and (10), the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals was rejected (ρ  = -0.384).
Hence, the estimation for MAE in the Latin American sample countries again includes adjustment for first-order
autocorrelation.- 40 -
Table 9: Sub-Sector Level – ASIA
FGLS estimation, with individual country effects, heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation
Dependent variable: FDISUBSEC; number of observations: 50/60 (see below)


















































2 0.56 0.68 0.61
Number of observations   50 60 50







Note: z-values in parentheses; ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level- 41 -
5. Conclusion
The contribution of this study to the FDI literature lies in an innovative definition of an
investment flow variable and in the affirmation that the issue of country risk does matter in
the case of German FDI flows to Latin American and Asian emerging markets in the 1990s.
As to the former, the endeavor to virtuously combine fully-consolidated FDI data from the
Bundesbank stock statistics with the evident merits of considering flow data has yielded a
quasi-flow variable embodying first differences of annual direct investment stocks corrected
for effective participation rates, previously included balance-sheet depreciation and
subsequently repatriated profits. Put plainly, this new variable seeks to emulate overall FDI
flows – unavailable from the balance of payments – at near-market prices and pursuant to the
IMF’s directional principle as well as the comprehensive OECD benchmark definition of
foreign direct investment.
Regarding empirical results, the regression outcome for the size-adjusted FDI flow variable
confirms the widely-held hypothesis that a high degree of economic and political risk is
detrimental to cross-border equity participation. Aiming to put this verdict on a broader
foundation, the study uses two professional country risk indices, both of which turn out to be
highly significant for the Latin American and Asian sub-samples. This finding thus confirms
the presumption that international investors indeed perceive impending changes in the
macroeconomic and regulatory environment. Subdividing country risk into its components, it
is found that economic risk represents the main driving force behind this unequivocal result,
whereas the evidence for headline political risk is best described as erratic owing to its
disparate individual elements. While, for both regions, the measure of administrative quality
alias corruption and malfeasance by the host government is consistently strongly associated
with marginal FDI inflows, the variable of host country political stability turns out
insignificant or even displays a negative sign. Investors’ dislike of unwarranted government
behavior, inter alia excessive payment of bribes, restrictions on intra-company transfers or
outright expropriation, is especially pronounced in the Asian sample countries, with the
administrative risk variable being robust against the inclusion of other controls.
With respect to these control variables, the regression results differ markedly between the two
regions. In Latin America, FDI inflows throughout the last decade are to be called “market-
seeking” in that German firms were apparently impelled to establish a presence abroad by the
necessity to overcome critical host country tariff barriers and, in a sense, to react in a timely
manner to rising direct investment on the part of foreign competitors. By contrast, German
multinationals accessing the Asian markets seemed to have been in search of low labor and
financing costs as well as an open trade regime since their direct investment is clearly vertical
in nature. These differences cause a test on identity of coefficients between regions to be- 42 -
rejected, implying that factors determining FDI flows have differed between Latin America
and Asia. Hence, as far as Germany is concerned, there does not seem to be a unique pattern
of foreign direct investment across regions of emerging market economies. Incidentally, real
exchange rate volatility apparently propelled German FDI in Asia, and, in fact, in none of the
country-level regressions does this measure end up being significantly negative. These
findings tend to strengthen the hypothesized positive impact of exchange rate fluctuations on
the willingness of investors to establish production facilities abroad.
In addition, the availability of firm-level data allows for sectoral and sub-sectoral analysis.
FDI flows to manufacturing sectors abroad generally mimic the characteristics of those at the
country level with the main exception of GDP per capita being negatively related to inflows
to Latin America and strongly positively related to those to Asia. Moreover, the measure of
trade barriers loses its significance in the Latin American sample, while for the Asian
countries the agglomeration variable now also passes the robustness test. Lastly, the
hypothesis that capital-intensive industries react more strongly to deteriorating investment
conditions is confirmed by German data, as the administrative political risk variable carries
strongly positive coefficients in the regressions for the capital-intensive chemical sector in
both regions while those for the labor-centered information/communication technology
industry are found to be insignificant each time.
In sum, researchers studying foreign direct investment in emerging market economies ought
to take increased account of non-traditional variables such as country risk or agglomeration
effects. The econometric results of this study affirm that the discernible trend towards
factoring in measures of the regulatory environment facing foreign investors is clearly called
for. As “soft” locational factors become more material in the eyes of investors, analyses
incorporating qualitative assessments of host countries are likely to gain further prominence
in FDI research.- 43 -
Appendix
Table 10: Absolute FDI-Flows, LATIN AMERICA/ASIA; Country Level
FGLS estimation, with individual country effects, heteroskedastic with cross-sectional correlation




































Note: z-values in parentheses; ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level
Figure 6: An Example of the Extreme Bounds Analysis
      |---------y--------|          z  |------------------xj-----------------|
FDI = α +GDP+CRISK (1,2) +ß3 ULC +  DUTY+DEBT+AGGLO (4,5,6)
+ß3 ULC +  DUTY+DEBT+CFLOW (4,5,7)
(check: is ß3 higher (lower) than the upper (lower) extreme bound so far? If so, adjust bound)
+ß3 ULC  +  DEBT+CFLOW+RERVOL (5,6,7)
+ß3 ULC  +  AGGLO+CFLOW+RERVOL (6,7,8)
+ß4 DUTY +  CRISK+DEBT+AGGLO (3,5,6)
  and so on until:
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